Mogale Alloys (Pty) Ltd v Nuco Chrome Boputhatswana (Pty) Ltd 2011 (6) SA 96 (GSJ) by Badenhorst, Pieter & Du Plessis, Jean
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Badenhorst, Pieter and Du Plessis, Jean 2012, Mogale Alloys (Pty) Ltd v Nuco Chrome 
Boputhatswana (Pty) Ltd 2011 (6) SA 96 (GSJ), De jure, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 388-404. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30049934 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner.  
 
Copyright : 2012, Pretoria University Law Press 
388
Onlangse regspraak/Recent case law
Mogale Alloys (Pty) Ltd v Nuco Chrome 
Boputhatswana (Pty) Ltd 
2011 (6) SA 96 (GSJ)
Alienation or disposal of a “controlling interest” in a prospecting company
1 Introduction
Section 11(1) of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act
28 of 2002 (hereafter “MPRDA”) contains a restraint against the
alienation or transfer of prospecting rights, an undivided share in such
rights or a controlling interest in a company or close corporation holding
such rights, unless the approval of the Minister of Mineral Resources is
obtained. The restraint also applies to mining rights to minerals,
exploration and production rights to petroleum (ss 11(1) and 69(2)
MPRDA). As the Mogale decision dealt with prospecting rights, our
discussion shall focus on prospecting rights but the principles are of
course also applicable to the other rights. The Mogale decision is
significant because it gives some indication of what is meant by a
“controlling interest” in terms of section 11(1) of the MPRDA. It also
illustrates how important it is to meticulously execute conditions in
contracts, and to understand the consequences of the non-fulfilment of
suspensive conditions if these consequences are harsh and unfair but
stipulated in the agreement. In effect, the plaintiff in this case paid R3
million for shares, but was unsuccessful in enforcing the agreement
through an order for specific performance because two suspensive
conditions were not fulfilled, and the contract contained a clause
preventing the plaintiff reclaiming the R3 million. In short, the plaintiff
paid R3 million but never became a shareholder of the company and
could not recover the payment contractually. 
At the outset, an exposition of the facts, the relief claimed, the
arguments of the court and what was decided by the court will be
covered. In our commentary the requirements for the granting of
prospecting rights will be given as background information, followed by
our analysis of section 11(1) and (2) of the MPRDA. We intend to show
that a clear distinction ought to be made between the alienation of a
prospecting right (or share thereof) and the alienation of a “controlling
interest” in a company or close corporation holding a prospecting right.
The meaning of a “controlling interest” in a company or close
corporation for purposes of section 11(1) will be examined, as well as the
complexities of determining such meaning. It will be argued that
requirements in terms of section 11(2) apply to the prospecting
company or close corporation that intends to alienate, transfer or
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dispose of a prospecting right (or undivided share therein). However, the
requirements of section 11(2) do not apply to the shareholder or member
of a close corporation (whether a juristic person or a natural person) that
intends to alienate, transfer or dispose of the person’s “controlling
interest” in a prospecting company. Section 11(2) also does not apply to
the person (whether a juristic person or a natural person) that obtains
such a “controlling interest”. We argue that there is confusion in the
Mogale case between the juristic person holding the prospecting right
and the shareholders or members of the close corporation holding a
“controlling interest” in a company or close corporation wanting to
alienate, transfer or dispose of such “controlling interest”.
2 The Facts
Nuco Chrome Boputhatswana (Pty) Ltd (hereafter “Nuco”) is a private
company, which held a prospecting right for precious metals on certain
farms in the North West province (par 7). The shareholding of Nuco was
as follows: Butler held 52%; Van Zyl 12%; Uthango (Pty) Ltd 26%; and
the Royal Bafokeng Nation 10% (pars 2 and 8). Butler sold 33% of his
shares to Mogale Alloys (Pty) Ltd (hereafter “Mogale”) for R3 million. For
current purposes, four clauses in the agreement between Butler and
Mogale (Pty) Ltd are of particular importance. 
There were two suspensive conditions in the agreement. The first
(clause 5.1.2) required “the approval of the Department of Mineral
Resources of the sale [of] equity to the purchaser, to the extent such
approval is required by law” (par 14). The parties were ad idem that this
clause was a reference to section 11(1) of the MPRDA (par 15). In terms
of section 11(1) of the MPRDA, such approval was required, inter alia, for
the transfer, alienation or disposal of a “controlling interest” in a private
company (or close corporation) holding a prospecting right (Nuco held
such right).
The second suspensive condition (clause 5.1.3) related to the pre-
emptive rights of other shareholders in Nuco (Pty) Ltd, as contemplated
in article 64.1 of Nuco’s Articles of Association – article 64.1 was very
similar to the standard pre-emptive right provision contained in private
companies’ Articles of Association, requiring shareholders in private
companies to first offer their shares to the other shareholders in such a
private company before the shares could be sold to third parties (see par
48). The question arose as to whether the Royal Bafokeng Nation, as one
of the shareholders, had such a right of pre-emption (par 4).
The third important clause in the contract between Butler and Mogale
was clause 5.3, which stipulated that if any of the suspensive conditions
were not fulfilled within a period of 180 days from the date of the
signature of the agreement, then the agreement was to lapse and be of
no force and effect (par 6). 
The fourth important clause, clause 5.4, is quite a remarkable clause
as it stipulated that if the agreement failed because the Minister’s
approval was not obtained (the clause 5.1.2 suspensive condition),
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Mogale Ltd would have no right to recover the R3 million paid for the
33% of Butler’s shares, but shall have the right(s) envisaged in clause 5.4
(par 41). Unfortunately, it is not revealed what these rights were. 
Butler passed away (par 9). Neither the Minister nor the Department
of Mineral Resources had consented to the sale of shares by Butler to
Mogale (par 16). When the Royal Bafokeng Nation was informed about
the intended sale to Mogale they indicated that they did not consent to
the sale either (see par 52).
3 Relief Claimed and Arguments Raised
In a claim for specific performance, Mogale claimed delivery of the
shares purchased (par 1). In the alternative, Mogale claimed repayment
of the R3 million which it had paid for the shares in terms of the
agreement (par 1).
Nuco and the executors of Butler (“the defendants”) denied that the
suspensive conditions in clauses 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 of the agreement had
been fulfilled (par 4). They argued that the Minister’s consent was
required for the disposal of the shares to Mogale (par 22). According to
the defendants, section 11(1) of the MPRDA was directed at the acquirer
and not the disposer of the interest (par 21). They submitted that
“controlling interest” in section 11(1) of the MPRDA referred to the
majority shareholding in a company which held prospecting rights (par
22). At the date of sale, Butler owned the majority of the shares and by
selling 33% to Mogale, Butler would no longer hold the majority shares
in Nuco (par 22). It was argued that the Minister’s written consent was
required because the sale was going to have the effect of moving the
controlling interest from Butler (par 22) as he would then only hold 19%
of the shares (52% minus 33%).
Mogale contended that ministerial approval was not required because
the agreement did not change the “controlling interest” in Nuco (par 5)
or transfer a controlling interest from Butler to Mogale (par 17). It was
submitted that “controlling interest” meant something other than a
shareholding of more than 50%. “Controlling interests” in section 11(1)
of the MPRDA “could imply different things, depending on the
circumstances” (par 17). It was argued that the fact that Butler held 52%
of the shares did not necessarily make it a controlling interest (par 17).
Reliance was placed on the meaning of “control” and “controlling
interests” in section 12(2) of the Competition Act 98 of 1998, and section
1 of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 (see par 7). Mogale also contended that
the Royal Bafokeng Nation did not have a right of preemption (par 5). In
the alternative, it was contended that, “if RBN had such a right, the
conditions should be held to have been fictionally fulfilled, because Butler
(and his agents) deliberately prevented the condition from being fulfilled”
(par 5).
4 Decision
At issue was whether the abovementioned suspensive conditions had
been fulfilled (see par 4). The court held that the first suspensive
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condition was not fulfilled because the Minister’s consent was required
but not obtained (par 40). Despite the court’s conclusion being decisive
of Mogale claim and alternative claim, the court “nevertheless, briefly
traversed the question of fulfilment of the second condition…”(par 41).
The court also found that the second condition was not fulfilled (par 52).
The outcome was that Mogale could not claim the R3 million because the
contract prevented it from doing so (par 41). The decision of the court
will now be examined in more detail.
4 1 Alienation of a “Controlling Interest”
According to the court, section 11 of the MPRDA has as its purpose the
regulation of the transfer and encumbrance of prospecting rights that
were granted by the Minister (parr 27, 37). According to the court,
section 11(1) of the MPRDA places a prospecting right, an interest in a
prospecting right and a controlling interest in a company or close
corporation on the same footing (par 27). It applies to companies and
close corporations which have prospecting rights (par 30) and regulates
the disposal of the controlling interest (parr 28, 38). Section 11(1) of the
MPRDA only refers to “controlling interest” in companies and close
corporations (par 32).
“Controlling interest” is not defined in the MPRDA. An “interest” is
described as something that is capable of being disposed of by any of the
means envisaged in section 11(1) of the MPRDA and includes a
proprietary interest (see parr 33, 36). An interest includes shares or rights
(par 36; see also Dale, Bekker, Bashall et al South African Mineral and
Petroleum Law (2005) 168 par 118.4). According to the court, the words
“controlling interest” ought to be interpreted as a one composite phrase
(par 31). A “controlling interest” has to be the interest that controls the
company (or close corporation) (par 37). According to the court, the
“term ‘controlling interest’ cannot be confined to a single characteristic,
or criterion” (par 37). The list of criteria is not exhaustive but, in the case
of a company, it may, mean any of the following:
(a) more than 50% of the issued share capital of the company; 
(b) more than half of the voting rights in respect of the issued shares of the
company;
(c) the power to either directly or indirectly appoint, remove or veto the
appointment of the majority of the directors of the company without the
concurrence of another; or 
(d) the right of a shareholder (even if notionally) to more than half of the
company's profits or assets (par 37).
According to the court, section 11(2) of the MPRDA indirectly indicates
the purpose of section 11(1), namely, the acquirer must be capable of
complying with the requirements, terms, conditions and obligations of a
prospecting right before the Minister can consent (see par 28). Section
11(2) makes it clear that “one of the main purposes is for vetting of the
intended acquirer of that right” (par 37). The court concluded that the
“acquirer, or intended acquirer, of such a controlling interest in the
company would have to be vetted for regulatory purposes” (par 37).
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The court held that “what has to be determined is whether the interest
was a ‘controlling interest’ at least at the time of the proposed disposal”
(par 38). Coppin J provided the following scenarios:
If a majority shareholder intends to dispose of his entire shareholding to
another, or others, the Minister's consent would clearly be required. If the
majority shareholder, with the controlling interest, intends to dispose only of
a portion of his interest and the disposal will not result in a change of control,
i.e. the shareholder will retain the controlling interest, then the disposal
would, in my view, not require the Minister's consent. If, however, the effect
of the disposal would be that the holder of the controlling interest would lose
such control, then the disposal would require the Minister's consent, even if
no one else acquires that controlling interest (par 38).
Applied to the facts, Coppin J held as follows:
Butler was the holder of at least 52% of the shares in Nuco at the time of the
agreement. This shareholding would, in my view, constitute a ‘controlling
interest’ in Nuco in the sense I held above. The fact that he did not sell the
entire 52% to Mogale but only 33%, which would have had the effect of
reducing his interest to less than a ‘controlling interest’, does not mean that
the Minister's consent for the disposal to Mogale, in terms of the agreement,
was not required. In my view the Minister's consent was indeed required (par
39).
Coppin J reasoned that the Minister has a discretion in terms of section
11 of the MPRDA to consent to the disposal or refuse it (par 38). The fact
that the disposal would have the effect that the controlling interest no
longer vests in the disposer, is a matter for the Minister’s consideration
(par 38). It was held that a change in control may hold implications for
the company’s capabilities to comply with its obligations relating to
prospecting, and its capacity to sustain compliance with the
requirements of a prospecting right in section 17 of the MPRDA (par 38).
The court found that because “the Minister's consent was not obtained
to date, or within the 180 days allowed for in the agreement, the
suspensive condition contained in clause 5.1.2 of the agreement was not
fulfilled” (par 40). Due to non-fulfilment of this condition, the court held
that the agreement had lapsed. Therefore, in terms of clause 5.4 of
agreement, the R3 million paid could not be recovered by Mogale (par
41). Despite its finding the court deemed it necessary to briefly consider
the fulfilment of the second suspensive condition in clause 5.1.3 of the
agreement as well (par 41).
4 2 Right of Pre-emption
The court found that the Royal Bafokeng Nation had retained a right of
pre-emption in terms of article 64.1 of the Articles of Association (par
52). Proof of the actual notification of the proposed sale of shares to
Mogale (Pty) Ltd was not produced. In the Royal Bafokeng Nation’s
response (which was produced as evidence) it indicated that they did not
consent to the proposed sale of shares (see par 52). The court found that
the second condition (stipulated in clause 5.1.3 of the agreement of sale)
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was also not fulfilled (par 52). (By implication, the agreement had lapsed
as contemplated in clause 5.3 of the agreement (see par 40)). 
As to Mogale’s alternative claim of fictional fulfilment of the condition
because of Butler’s alleged prevention of fulfilment, the court required
(par 54) that Mogale: 
[m]ust prove that the condition was not fulfilled and that Butler had a duty
regarding the fulfilment of the condition, and that he breached that duty with
the intention of frustrating or preventing the fulfilment of the condition.
The intention required is dolus: the “debtor should have acted with the
direct intention of preventing the obligation from becoming enforceable”
(see par 56). The court concluded on the evidence that Butler had not
“acted intentionally with regard to the non-fulfilment of the condition
under consideration, particularly insofar as it pertains to RBN” (par 62).
Thus, the plaintiff was also unsuccessful in proving “fictional fulfilment”
of clause 5.1.3.
As we are of the view that the court’s finding about the second
condition was not really necessary, but correct, it will not be discussed
further.
5 Commentary: The Alienation of Prospecting Rights (or 
Undivided Share Thereof) or a Controlling Interest in a 
Company Holding Prospecting Rights
5 1 General Requirements
The acquisition and exercise of prospecting rights, and the alienation of
prospecting rights or a controlling interest in a company holding
prospecting rights, are governed by the MPRDA. A prospecting right to
minerals is granted to an applicant by the Minister of Mineral Resources
(s 17(1) of the MPRDA). This power of the Minister has been delegated to
the Deputy Director-General: Mineral Development (s 103 of the MPRDA;
item 5 of the Delegation of powers by the Minister of Minerals and
Energy to officers in the Department of Minerals and Energy 2004-05-12
(further references would, however, still be to the “Minister”)).
In terms of section 17(1), for a prospecting right to be granted to an
applicant, it is required that the applicant must have: (a) the financial
resources and the technical ability to conduct the proposed prospecting
operation optimally in accordance with the prospecting work
programme; and (b) the ability to comply with the relevant provisions of
the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996. The applicant must also not
have contravened any relevant provision of the MPRDA (see s 17(1)(e)
MPRDA). It is further required that the estimated prospecting expendi-
ture is compatible with the proposed prospecting operation and duration
of the prospecting work programme, and prospecting will not result in
unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the
environment (see s 17(1)(b), (c) MPRDA). In addition, the grant of a
prospecting right may not result in an exclusionary act, prevent fair
competition, or result in the concentration of the particular mineral
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resource under the control of the applicant (see s 17(2) MPRDA). It may
be required of an applicant to expand the opportunities for historically
disadvantaged persons in terms of section 2(1)(d) of the MPRDA (see s
17(4)). These are the requirements for the acquisition of a prospecting
right in terms of section 17 of the MPRDA.
A prospecting right is granted for five years (s 17(6) MPRDA). Such
prospecting right is subject to the stipulated terms and conditions of the
right, the MPRDA and any other relevant law (s 17(6) MPRDA). In
Maccsand v City of Cape Town ((709/10) [2011] ZASCA 141 par 33) and
Louw NO v Swartland Municipality ((650/10) [2011] ZASCA 142 parr 11,
12) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that “relevant laws” includes
provincial legislation, such as the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of
1985 of the Western Cape (“LUPO”), which regulates land use planning
and zoning by municipalities. The Constitutional court confirmed that the
exercise of a mining right granted in terms of the MPRDA is subject to
LUPO ((Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town ((CCT 103/11) [2012]
ZACC 7) par 51). The court reasoned that there is nothing in the MPRDA
suggesting that LUPO will cease to apply to land upon the granting of a
mining right or mining permit (44). The holder of a prospecting right is
entitled to apply for a retention permit (s 31) to suspend the prospecting
right (s 32(2)), whilst retaining the exclusive right to apply for a mining
right (s 35(1)). The prospector has the exclusive right to apply for -
(a) the renewal of a prospecting right (s 19(1)(a)), and 
(b) a mining right in respect of the mineral and prospecting area (s
19(1)(b)). 
Linkage of a prospecting right with a future mining right is thus ensured,
making a prospecting right, depending on the results of prospecting, a
very valuable right. Various duties relating to prospecting are imposed
upon a prospector (see further s 17(2)). Environmental provisions in
chapter 4 of the MPRDA impose several environmental duties and
responsibilities on prospectors and miners. For instance, a prospector or
miner is responsible for any environmental damage, pollution or
ecological degradation caused by his prospecting operations (s 38(1)(e))
and the management thereof until the Minister has issued a closure
certificate to the holder of the prospecting right (s 43(1)). Directors of a
company may even become jointly and severally liable “for any
unacceptable negative impact on the environment, including damage,
degradation or pollution advertently or inadvertently caused by the
company or close corporation which they represent or represented” (see
s 38(2)).
Section 11(1) provides that a prospecting right, an interest in a
prospecting right or controlling interest in a company or close
corporation, may only “be ceded, transferred, let, sublet, assigned,
alienated or otherwise disposed of” with the written consent of the
Minister (s 11(1)). The consent required in section 11(1) does not apply
to a change of the controlling interest of a listed company (s 11(1); as to
the meaning of a “listed company”, see further Dale, Bekker, Bashall et
al 174 par 118.8). An interest in a prospecting right refers to an undivided
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(aliquot) share for purposes of coholdership of prospecting rights,
whereas, an interest in a company refers to shares in the company. At
common law, two or more holders could have held mineral rights and a
co-holder was entitled to mine his proportionate share of the mineral
deposits, provided such exercise takes place without prejudice to the
rights of the other holder(s) (Erasmus v Afrikander Proprietary Mines Ltd
(1976 1 SA 950 (W) 950, 962H). In terms of the common law,
prospecting (or mining) rights granted in terms of the MPRDA are
capable of being jointly held by two or more holders (see Badenhorst and
Olivier “Conversion of ‘old order mining right’: “Sleeping at the MPRDA’s
wheel of (mis)fortune? Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Mineral Resources” (unreported decision) Case no 28980/10 (NGD)
2012**).
The Minister has to provide proper reasons for her decision. For
instance, the Minister’s refusal of an application for the transfer of a
prospecting right in terms of section 11(1) of the MPRDA was set aside
in Rhino Plat (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and Energy (2009 JDR 0399
(GNP) 17) and the only reason given by the Minister for her decision was
the statement that the grant would defeat the objectives of the MPRDA
(par 11). The court found on the papers that the applicant met the
requirements of sections 17(1) and 2(d) of the MPRDA (par 16). In
addition, the court found that there were no reasons why the application
should not be granted by the Minister (par 16). An order was made by
the court that the Minister should forthwith consent to the Applicant’s
application! (par 17) The decision of Seriti J is clearly incorrect because it
was not an instance where the court could substitute the decision by the
Minister with a decision by the court (see par 15) and order the Minister
to consent thereto. Because the decision has been set aside, the Minister
would have to consider the application anew, exercise her discretion and
give proper reasons for her decision.
Restraints against the transfer, alienation or disposal of prospecting or
mining rights also occur in other mineral law systems. For instance,
similar prohibitions against assignment, sub-letting or transfer of mining
rights or interests in mining rights without ministerial permission or
approval, occur in the mining laws of some Australian states (see s 300
Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld); s 83(1) of the Mining Act 1971 (SA); s
33 Mineral Resources Development Act 1990 (Vic); and s 83(1)(d) of the
Mining Act 1978 (WA)). Before approval is granted in the state of Victoria,
the Minister must be satisfied that: the applicant is a fit and proper
person to hold the mining licence, intends to comply with the Act,
genuinely intends to do the work, has an appropriate work programme,
and is likely to be able to finance the proposed work and rehabilitation
of the land (s 15(6)).
5 2 Disposal of “[a] Prospecting Right or an Interest in 
Such a Right”
The first part of section 11(1) clearly deals with the prospecting right or
an undivided share therein. As was explained under paragraph 5.1
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above, this is the prospecting right granted for a period of five years by
the Minister, and takes into consideration the requirements mentioned
under paragraph 5.1 above. As there are requirements pertaining to
“financial resources” and “prospecting expenditure”, it will normally
require some capital investment and most probably more than one
person involved in the project or undertaking. In this regard a private
company or a close corporation as holder of the prospecting right is an
ideal business vehicle for such undertakings, unless large amounts of
capital are required, in which case a public company will be the obvious
business form. Several individuals can take up shares in the private
company or a member’s interest in a close corporation. In the case of
Nuco (Pty) Ltd, the company had an authorised share capital of R50 000,
divided into 50 000 ordinary shares (par value) of R1,00 (par 8), and the
shareholders would have taken up those shares proportionally to
determine their percentage of shareholding. Although we do not have the
details in Nuco’, there will normally be additional forms of financing for
such undertakings, for example, bank loans or overdraft facilities for the
company or the close corporation. 
In the exercise of a ministerial discretion to grant a prospecting right
to a company or close corporation, the Minister will doubtlessly take into
consideration who the shareholders of the company or the members of
the close corporation are, otherwise the general aim of fairness and
community considerations could be defeated. As was seen above in the
case of Nuco, there were two individuals involved (Butler, 52% and Van
Zyl, 12%), but also a company (Uthango Pty Ltd, 26%) and the Royal
Bafokeng Nation (10%). It should, however, be appreciated that the
prospecting right will be granted to the company or the close corporation
as separate legal entities, not to the individual shareholders or members.
Section 11(1) clearly provides for ministerial approval if a company or
close corporation would in any way attempt to cede, transfer, let, sublet,
assign, alienate or otherwise dispose of the “prospecting … right or an
interest in any such right” (first part of 11s (1)). Section 11(2) then
contains an interesting provision:
11(2) The consent referred to in subsection (1) must be granted if the
cessionary, transferee, lessee, sublessee, assignee or the person to whom the
right will be alienated or disposed of-
(a) is capable of carrying out and complying with the obligations and the
terms and conditions of the right in question; and
(b) satisfies the requirements contemplated in section 17 ...
It should be noted that there are two different sets of requirements here.
The one contained in 11(2)(a) deals with the “obligation and the terms
and conditions of the right in question”. In other words, here the focus
will be on whether the new holder of the prospecting right can still carry
out and comply with the obligations, terms and conditions initially
attached to the prospecting right when it was granted. Section 11(2)(b),
as far as a prospecting right is concerned, simply refers to the
requirements of section 17 (see further discussion below).
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It is apparent that there is no discretion for the Minister if the
requirements are met – “[t]he consent referred to in subsection (1) must
be granted … ” (emphasis added). In other words, a company or close
corporation that holds prospecting rights and that passes a resolution to
dispose of the prospecting right, say to another company or close
corporation, must obtain the approval of the Minister, but the Minister
cannot refuse it if the requirements of section 11(2) are met. We
appreciate that whether or not the requirements in section 11(2) are
actually met or not could lead to complex disputes, but that is not the
focus of this case note. That is particularly so because of the two sets of
different requirements contained in section 11(2)(a) and section 11(2)(b),
respectively.
Suppose some of the minority shareholders or members holding a
minority interest in a close corporation are opposed to the disposal of the
prospecting right, is there anything they can do? There will be at least two
forms of protection for the minority shareholder or members of a close
corporation if they are not happy with the disposal, and all the
requirements expected in section 11(2) are met. First, a special
resolution (75%) will be required if a company or close corporation
disposes of the whole, or substantially the whole, of the company or close
corporation, or disposes of all or the greater part of the assets of the
corporation (see s 228(1) Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter the “1973
Companies Act”); s 112(2)(a) Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter the
“2008 Companies Act”); s 46(b) Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984
(hereafter the “CC Act”)). The disposal of the prospecting right of a
company or close corporation formed for prospecting or mining
purposes will surely be considered to be such a disposal. Secondly, there
are remedies available for minority shareholders and members of close
corporations in the case of oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct
(see s 252 1973 Companies Act; s 163 2008 Companies; s 49 CC Act).
5 3 Disposal of a “Controlling Interest”
One of the difficulties experienced by Coppin J in the Mogale decision
was that neither “control”, nor “interest” nor “controlling interest” are
defined. It is, therefore, of interest to make a few general comments
about these concepts that may throw some light on the intention of the
Legislator, and may assist if the term “controlling interest” needs to be
interpreted in future cases. 
Traditionally, the concept of “control” in company law is used to
determine whether there exists a relationship of a holding company and
subsidiary between companies (groups of companies) and to establish
whether there were abuses of “control”. Also linked to this is “control” of
companies by managers and directors to determine under which
circumstances loans made by companies to directors or managers were
prohibited. Under the 1973 Companies Act these aspects were governed
by sections 1(3), 37 and 226. There are, of course, now comparable
provisions in the 2008 Companies Act, but as the case was decided under
legislation drafted when the 1973 Companies Act was still in the
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governing piece of legislation, we will not refer to the new provisions, but
realise that they will be of considerable importance for future purposes.
The interrelationship between sections 1(3), 37 and 226 of the 1973
Companies Act has been renowned for its complexities and
technicalities, not least because of the different meanings of “control” in,
for instance, section 1(3) and section 226(1A)(B) of the 1973 Companies
Act. It is beyond the scope of this case note to analyse these complexities,
but it may be of some interest to note the similarities of “controlling
interest” in section 1 of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 as quoted by
Coppin J (par 18) with the way in which the holding company-subsidiary
relationship was determined under section 1(3) of the 1973 Companies
Act. It will be noted that for purposes of that subsection, a company shall
be deemed to be a subsidiary of another company if that other company
is a member of it and:
(a) holds a majority of the voting rights in it; or
(b) has the right to appoint or remove directors holding a majority of the
voting rights at meetings of the board; or
(c) has the sole control of a majority of the voting rights in it, whether
pursuant to an agreement with other members or otherwise.
It is also important to take note of the requirements for “control” for
purposes of section 226 of the 1973 Companies Act. Section 226 dealt,
inter alia, with the prohibition of loans to directors and managers. It
provided that these loans could not be made directly to a director or
manager of the company, its holding company or any other company
which is a subsidiary of its holding company (s 226(1)(a) 1973
Companies Act). Furthermore, and this is of particular importance for our
current discussion, such loans or securities could also not be made to any
other company or other body corporate controlled by one or more
directors or managers of the company, or of its holding company or of
any company which is a subsidiary of its holding company (s 226(1)(b)
1973 Companies Act).
It was, thus, vital for purposes of section 226 that “control” was defined
and that was done in section 226(1A) of the 1973 Companies Act. The
circumstances when it would have been deemed that there was such
control by one or more directors or managers (“controlling” director or
manager) of a company can be summarised as follows:
(a) When the “controlling” director or manager can appoint or remove the
majority of the directors in another company. The power to appoint
directors will then be deemed to exist if the directors in the other
company can only be appointed as directors of that other company if
the “controlling” director’s or manager’s consent or concurrence is
required for such an appointment;
(b) When the “controlling” director or manager holds more than one-half of
the equity share capital of that other company or body corporate or, if
that other body corporate is a corporation as defined in section 1 of the
Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act 69 of 1984), more than 50 per cent of
the interest in such corporation.
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It would be surprising if, when the phrase “controlling interest” was
included in section 11(1) of the MPRDA (the 1973 Companies Act was
then still the governing piece of company law legislation), the Legislator
did not have in mind some of these forms of “control”. Thus, we agree
with Coppin J that “[t]he ‘interest’ must be one that controls the company
(or close corporation)” (par 37). In terms of general company law
principles, it is the power of control over the company’s two primary
organs, namely, the board of directors and the general meeting
(shareholders) that would give control over company matters. The simple
reality is that if you control the board of directors or you have control
over the general meeting, you control the company. We note that Dale
et al (172 par 118.5) submit that the term “controlling interest” will
include “both a direct or indirect controlling interest” and we agree with
that. However, it will probably provide particular challenges to determine
exactly what such “indirect controlling interests” are and when and how
they are disposed of or alienated. For example, if a holding company has
two subsidiaries and one subsidiary holds 25% of the shares (each share
representing one vote) in a prospecting company and the other
subsidiary holds 26% of the shares (each share representing one vote) in
such a prospecting company, then the holding company has “indirect”
control over the prospecting company – the holding company’s two
subsidiaries hold more than 50% of the shares and can exercise more
than 50% of the voting rights at the prospecting company’s general
meeting. Does this mean that if the “controlling interest” of the holding
company is affected that it “indirectly” affects the “controlling interest”
in the prospecting company and that ministerial approval for the shift of
the “controlling interest” in the holding company will also be required?
Also, suppose one of the two subsidiaries sell, say, 2% of their shares,
then the holding company loses its indirect control over the prospecting
company, because it can no longer, indirectly, control the prospecting
company through its subsidiaries – the two subsidiaries jointly now only
hold 49% of the shares and voting rights in the prospecting company.
Will such a disposal of shares in one of the subsidiaries then also trigger
the application of section 11(1), requiring ministerial consent?
Furthermore, if the holding company no longer controls any one of the
two subsidiaries in our example (in other words, one or both of them are
no longer considered subsidiaries), will such a change in the group
composition trigger the application of section 11(1), requiring ministerial
consent? It is submitted that it will indeed be the case in all the examples
given above, illustrating how complex matters can get, but there are even
more complexities involved here.
Aspects like shareholder agreements, weighted voting rights and
agreements between companies and third parties (for instance, an
agreement between a prospecting company and a third party that the
third party can appoint the majority of the directors of the prospecting
company or can remove the majority of the directors of the prospecting
company) can all be determining factors of who controls prospecting
companies. That means, to cede, transfer, assign, alienate or otherwise
400    2012 De Jure
dispose of any such “controlling interest” (“direct or indirect controlling
interests”) may require the consent of the Minister. This obviously adds
to the complexity of this area of law and could lead to considerable
uncertainty. We are of the opinion that reliance on principles enshrined
in paragraph 2.1.3.2 of the Codes of Good Practice for the Minerals
Industry (GN 446 GG 32167 2009-04-29 (as suggested by Dale et al 171
par 118.6)) or other provisions of the Code will not resolve these
uncertainties.
5 4 Distinguishing Between “The Right” and “Controlling 
Interest” in Section 11(2) of the MPRDA
In our view it is of particular importance to note that section 11(2) of the
MPRDA only refers to “the right” and not to the “controlling interest”. In
fact, it would be an absurdity from a company law point of view if the
Minister is required to consider whether the acquirer of the “controlling
interest”, that is, the new shareholder who holds the “controlling
interest”, meets the requirements of section 11(2) of the MPRDA. It is,
therefore, submitted that the following statement of Coppin J is incorrect:
“Thus, the acquirer, or intended acquirer, of such controlling interest in
the company would have to be vetted for regulatory purposes” (par 37).
The prospecting right vests in the company (Nuco) and the rights and
liabilities are the company’s (Nuco). Shareholders are protected against
liability by the corporate veil or, to put it differently, can rely on one of
the most fundamental concepts of modern company law, namely, the
concept of “limited liability of shareholders”. That means it is totally
irrelevant to consider whether the shareholders, or a new shareholder
now holding the “controlling interest”, have: (a) the financial resources
and the technical ability to conduct the proposed prospecting operation
optimally in accordance with the prospecting work programme; and (b)
the ability to comply with the relevant provisions of the Mine Health and
Safety Act 29 of 1996. The requirements mentioned in section 17 (see
reference to it in section 11(2)(b)) of the MPRDA are also totally irrelevant
as far as the shareholder having a “controlling interest” in a company or
a close corporation is concerned. It is the company (in this case Nuco)
that will have to meet those requirements. 
Thus, in our view, the following statement of Coppin J is also incorrect:
If there is a disposal of the controlling interest and an acquirer thereof, the
Minister must consent to the disposal if the acquirer of the interest meets the
requirements set out in s 11(2) (par 38).
This statement ignores the distinction in section 11(1) of the MPRDA
between “the prospecting right” (or undivided share therein) and the
“controlling interest” and who owns the right, that is, the company
(Nuco). The statement would have been correct if Nuco, as a company
with a separate existence from its shareholders, intended to dispose of
the prospecting right. Then the Minister needs to consider the
requirements mentioned in section 11(2) of the MPRDA. Coppin J clearly
realises the dilemma. He points out that “[r]eference to ‘the right’ in ss
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(2) must include ‘the controlling interest’ referred to in subsection (1)”.
He then explains that:
... otherwise there will be no apparent purpose, or guideline for the Minister,
when dealing, not with the disposal of what is described as a right in ss (1),
but with the disposal of the ‘controlling interest in a company or close
corporation’ (par 29).
Coppin J makes no finding in this regard (see last sentence of par 29), but
points out that “in dealing with the latter, the enquiry may of necessity
be slightly different because the right would vest in the company or close
corporation and not in those who control the company or close
corporation” (par 29). With respect, as was already mentioned above, the
enquiry will not be “slightly different”, it will be completely different.
None of the requirements mentioned in section 11(2) of the MPRDA,
including the reference to section 17 of the MPRDA, is relevant for
purposes of who holds the “controlling interest” in a company or close
corporation. In fact, whether a person holding a “controlling interest” in
a company or close corporation disposes of such “controlling interest” in
part or completely and, whether a new person holds such a “controlling
interest” after such a disposal, cannot have any bearing on whether or
not the company or close corporation will continue to have the capability
to comply with the statutory requirements set out in section 11(2) of the
MPRDA. The only thing which happens when there is a disposal of a
“controlling interest” is that the shareholding or holding of a member’s
interest will change hands. Thus, we fail to understand the logic behind
the following statement of Coppin J (last sentence of par 38):
A change in control may hold implications for the company's capabilities to
comply with its obligations relating to its prospecting, or mining right, (or
interest in such a right), and its capacity to sustain compliance with the
requirement of s 17 of the MPRDA, in the case where the relevant right is a
prospecting right.
There are indeed no specific guidelines or rules to assist the Minister in
determining whether to give consent, or to refuse consent, for the
disposal of a “controlling interest” in a company or close corporation as
required by section 11(1) of the MPRDA and the amendment of section
11. Promulgating regulations to provide rules and guidelines to assist the
Minister in this regard is something that the Department of Mineral
Resources should consider seriously. We would like to emphasise that we
are firmly of the opinion that the approval required under section 11(1)
as far as a “controlling interest” is concerned should not be linked to the
requirements referred to in section 11(2) – section 11(2) only applies to
the Minister’s consent under section 11(1) in so far as such consent is
required in relation to “[a] prospecting right or mining right or an interest
in any such right” (emphasis added). In other words, we disagree with
Coppin J’s statement that “[r]eference to ‘the right’ in ss (2) must include
‘the controlling interest’ referred to in ss (1)” (par 29). We appreciate that
it might be of considerable importance that the Minister should have a
discretion in consenting or not consenting to the transfer of a “controlling
interest” in a company or close corporation holding prospecting or
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mining rights and will, in what follows, make a few comments on this
aspect.
5 5 Ministerial Discretion to Consent to the Disposal of a 
“Controlling Interest”
Let us first speculate about instances where there could be no doubt that
the written consent of the Minister is required for disposal of a
“controlling interest” in the context of the Mogale decision. Coppin J is
clearly correct if he states that if a majority shareholder disposes of all his
shares, the Minister’s consent will clearly be required. He is also right that
no ministerial consent is required if the majority shareholder maintains
the majority shareholding after the disposal (par 38). As examples, if
Butler sold all his shares (53%) to Mogale, the approval must be obtained
but, if he only sold 1% of his shares to Mogale, no ministerial consent is
required. However, it should be understood that if Butler sold 25% of his
shares to Uthango, Uthango Ltd would then hold 51% of the shares in
Nuco (its existing 26% plus another 25%) and that would have required
ministerial consent to the disposal of the “controlling interest”. The
“controlling interest” would then move away from Butler to Uthango and
that should be seen as a disposal falling under section 11(1) of the
MPRDA.
The controversial part of the Mogale decision is that Coppin J held that
by giving up his “controlling interest” without enabling anybody else to
acquire the “controlling interest”, the ministerial approval under section
11(1) was still required. This is significant as it implies that, in effect,
ministerial approval is required in all cases where, for instance, a holder
of more than 50% of the shares in a company (or member’s interest in
a close corporation) with prospecting rights sells shares (member’s
interest in a close corporation) that would reduce the person’s
shareholding (member’s interest in a close corporation) in that company
(or close corporation) to below 50%. That will be the case irrespective of
the fact that after such disposal nobody would hold a “controlling
interest” in that company or close corporation.
In order to illustrate the significance of ministerial discretion when
there is a disposal of a “controlling interest”, we can use an example
related to the case under discussion. Suppose there were good reasons
for the Minister originally to vest the prospecting rights in the company
(Nuco), because the Minister was of the opinion that the Royal Bafokeng
Nation must hold 51% of the shares in Nuco. It is then understandable
that if the Royal Bafokeng Nation plans to dispose of the whole or part of
that “controlling interest”, in line with the spirit of the legislation (see
again discussion under 5 1 above), the Minister should have a discretion
whether or not to consent to the “controlling interest” shifting away from
the Royal Bafokeng Nation. The discretion will then probably be based
on the best interests of the Nation, the communities or, in particular, the
best interests of the Royal Bafokeng Nation in our example.
It will be clear from this conclusion that we agree with Coppin J’s
conclusion that ministerial consent is required under circumstances
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where the “controlling interest” moves to a different person, as well as in
circumstances where the person holding the “controlling interest” no
longer holds the “controlling interest”, even though nobody else obtains
such “controlling interest”. That was what happened in the case under
discussion: Butler sold off 33% of his 52% shareholding to Mogale (Pty)
Ltd, resulting in nobody holding any “controlling interest” any longer, as
the shareholding in Nuco would then have looked like this: Butler held
19%, Van Zyl 12%, Uthango (Pty) Ltd 26%; the Royal Bafokeng Nation
10%; and Mogale 33%. This is, of course, based on the assumption that
the agreement was valid and the Minister’s approval was sought, as well
as that the pre-emptive rights provided no obstacle to the validity of the
agreement (as was pointed out above, that was not what Coppin J
decided).
It is appropriate to make a final important point relating to “controlling
interests”. As far as shareholding or holding a member’s interest is
concerned, a very interesting practical consequence follows if nobody
holds a “controlling interest” any longer. It means that the shareholders
in our example above can dispose of any of their interests without any
ministerial approval required, up to a point where somebody else
acquires such a “controlling interest” again. If this consequence is
correct, then prospecting companies or close corporations would be well-
advised not to structure their companies or close corporations when
applying for a prospecting right with anybody holding more than 50% of
the shares or members’ interest. In this way, no ministerial approval will
be required for any disposal of shares or members’ interests up to the
point where one person acquires a “controlling interest” in such
companies or close corporations. One wonders whether this was the
intention of the Legislature. This provides another reason why it is
probably quite important for the Department of Mineral Resources to
clarify section 11 by amendment thereof or promulgation of regulations
to provide rules and guidelines pertaining to the disposal of “controlling
interests”.
6 Conclusion
Section 11(1) of the MPRDA prohibits the alienation, transfer or disposal
of - 
(a) a prospecting right or an undivided share in a prospecting right; or 
(b) a controlling interest in a company or close corporation holding such
interest. 
In situation (a), the alienee or transferee of the prospecting right or
undivided share therein must meet the requirements of section 17 of the
MPRDA, and be capable of carrying out the duties imposed by the
prospecting right and the terms and conditions thereof. We have argued
that there are several uncertainties as far as situation (b) is concerned,
and we have dealt with them in the context of general and specific
company law principles and provisions.
In situation (b), the company or close corporation (as a juristic person)
holding a prospecting right must still meet the requirements of section
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17, and must still be capable of carrying out the duties imposed by the
prospecting right and the terms and conditions thereof, when the
“controlling interest” in such company or close corporation moves away
from one person or when another person acquires such “controlling
interest”. A controlling interest “must be one that controls the company”
and that can be a direct or indirect “controlling interest”. In terms of
general company law principles, it is the power of control over the
company’s two primary organs, namely, the board of directors and the
general meeting (shareholders) that would give control over company
matters. We have, however, argued that the mentioned requirements do
not need to be met by the person who disposes of the “controlling
interest” or the person acquiring the “controlling interest”. In this regard
we criticised statements in the Mogale decision in so far as they leave the
impression that these requirements also apply to the person who
disposes of the “controlling interest” or the person acquiring the
“controlling interest”. 
Even though the outcome for the plaintiff was harsh, the Mogale
decision is good law as far as it was held that ministerial consent is
required if the “controlling interest” in a company or close corporation
moves away from one person without anybody else acquiring a
“controlling interest”. However, as pointed out, there are a few
statements in the case that should be treated with circumspection.
The complexities and possible uncertainties regarding the notion of a
“controlling interest” make it quite important for the Department of
Mineral Resources to clarify section 11 by amendment thereof or
promulgation of regulations, in order to provide rules and guidelines
pertaining to the disposal of “controlling interests” in prospecting (as well
as mining) companies and close corporations.
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